Introduction
The evolution of capital speci…c to a …rm plays a key role in how it develops over time as well as its optimal supply and investment decisions. Taking the price of capital used by a …rm as given, as if the …rm was a perfect competitor in the capital market, misses the fact that there is capital speci…c to a …rm that can only be moved between …rms at a nonlinear cost.
Both human and physical capital have this property. Moreover, how well-informed a …rm is about the structure of demand or the production process plays a crucial role in the dynamic analysis of the …rm. For instance, a …rm might be uninformed about the distribution of the random demand or the random production process. In that case, it has the opportunity to learn through experience. In other words, there is a relationship between the evolution of a …rm through capital accumulation and information acquisition about the structure of demand or the production process.
The issue of investment under uncertainty without learning has been studied extensively in optimal growth. In the early literature on optimal growth, the dynamic equation governing capital formation was deterministic, see Cass [5] and Koopmans [21] . This was a natural place to begin the study of optimal growth since growth had already been studied in a deterministic environment by Ramsey [29] and the technology for studying the problem in a more general, stochastic, environment had not yet been fully developed. This was changed by the optimal growth model of Brock and Mirman [4] which built on earlier studies of positive growth under uncertainty [26, 27] . The motivation for studying stochastic rather than deterministic growth models was to reduce the information available to the economic agents in order to provide more realistic results. Indeed, in deterministic models, the economic agents are assumed to have perfect foresight in understanding the e¤ect of their decisions on the future evolution of the dynamic system. Adding uncertainty in the dynamics means that the economic agents need not know precisely every outcome of their investment decisions, i.e., they need not know with certainty the e¤ect of their investment decisions on the future path of the system.
Although the assumption of stochastic growth is less restrictive than the original one of deterministic dynamics, it is still quite restrictive since it requires that the economic agents know precisely the stochastic e¤ect of their investment decisions on the future evolution of the dynamic system, i.e., perfect foresight is replaced by rational expectations. It would be even more useful and realistic to study models in which the future outcome of present decisions is even murkier by assuming that the economic agents do not have complete knowledge of the distribution of future stochastic outcomes. For instance, suppose that the economic agents do not know about a parameter characterizing the distribution. They would then have to learn about the environment they face. Rational expectations would then be applied not only on the stochastic variables as in the economic growth literature but also on the stochastic learning process. This change in modeling would lead to a better understanding of the e¤ect of optimal decisions on the dynamics of the economy and yield a more precise understanding of optimal saving and consumption than is currently available in economic growth models.
It is natural to expect that the ideas from the growth literature play an important role as well in the study of …rms faced with dynamic output decisions through the accumulation of speci…c capital.
There is an emerging literature studying the e¤ect of learning in dynamic models of economic growth as well as more general dynamic models, beginning with the paper of Freixas [15] , but also including the works of El-Gamal and Sundaram [12] , Bertocchi and Spagat [3] , and Datta et al. [7] . These studies are, in turn, based on the models of learning in which the only link between periods is beliefs. See Prescott [28] [19] . In these models, there is no natural dynamics and thus no possibility to study investment. To the issues studied in these nondynamic models, the introduction of a natural dynamics adds a rich and complicated set of questions and issues that have either been studied super…cially in the literature or have not yet been addressed. In fact, there are many aspects that must be considered when studying the e¤ect of learning and experimentation in dynamic models. For instance, the unknown parameter could be in the objective function, in the dynamic equation, or in both.
Although learning may be studied in the context of economic growth models, we focus on industrial organization. Speci…cally, we study how learning a¤ects the behavior of an uninformed monopolist in a dynamic model with capital that is speci…c to the …rm, along the lines studied in Koulovatianos and Mirman [22] . The monopolist faces multiplicative uncertainty in demand and is uninformed because he does not know one of the parameters de…ning the distribution of the random demand. There is no uncertainty or learning from the production process for capital. Observing prices reveals this information slowly. Both active or passive learning can be studied in our model depending on the parameter unknown to the monopolist. Active learning arises when the monopolist's decisions a¤ect the information used to learn about the unknown parameter while passive learning arises when the monopolist's decisions do not a¤ect the information used to learn about the unknown parameter.
It is the purpose of this paper to study the case of passive learning.
Incorporating learning into dynamic program brings another di¢ culty. It is that of modeling appropriately the distribution of the random demand along with the distribution that characterizes the prior belief about the unknown parameter of the distribution of the random demand. We discuss su¢ cient statistics and conjugate families of distributions and show their necessity in dynamic programming to be able to solve dynamic programs either analytically or numerically. This is important since it is not true that a solution to the in…nite-horizon program can be found either analytically or numerically for any kinds of distributions. See [23] for an exception.
We then use speci…c distributions to study the monopolist's behavior. Speci…cally, we rely on the fact the family of normal distributions with an unknown mean is a conjugate family for samples from a normal distribution to obtain closed-form solution for optimal supply and investment decisions. This enables us to study the e¤ect of learning on supply and investment decisions, as well as the steady state level of capital. In fact, we show that learning plays an important role in the optimal supply and investment decision of the …rm.
In our model, the demand shock is multiplicative in demand so that learning has no e¤ect on the monopolist's behavior if there is no cost function. When there is a cost function, learning a¤ects the monopolist's behavior. The higher the expected mean of the demand shock given its beliefs, the higher the supply and the lower the investment. Although learning does not a¤ect the steady state level of capital since the uninformed monopolist becomes informed in the limit, it reduces the speed of convergence to the steady state.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general model. We …rst discuss the dynamic framework in section 2.1, then the learning framework in section 2.2.
The dynamic framework is combined with the passive learning framework in section 2.3.
Bayesian statistics and techniques are discussed in section 3. The e¤ect of learning is studied in section 4. All proofs are relegated to section 5.
The General Model

The Dynamic Framework
Consider an in…nitely-lived monopolist who makes supply and investment decisions under uncertainty in demand in order to maximize the sum of discounted expected pro…ts subject to a deterministic law of motion for capital. The monopolist supplies J 1 exclusive markets.
In period t, the monopolist is endowed with a stock of capital k t yielding output f (k t ), from which q jt 0 is supplied to market j; j = 1; :::; J, and
and periods.
The monopolist's dynamic program is max ffqjtg
where 2 [0; 1] is the discount factor, subject to the law of motion (1) for capital.
The Learning Framework
Including parameters and in the model allows us to study the e¤ect of learning in economic models. Three cases are distinguished. First, the monopolist is uninformed only about the value of . Second, it is uninformed only about the value of . Third, it is uninformed about the values of both and . There is a di¤erence between learning about the value of and learning about the value of , namely, the di¤erence between active and passive learning. 1 Loosely speaking, under active learning, the monopolist's supply and investment decisions a¤ect the learning process while they do not under passive learning. While it is the purpose of this paper to focus on the case of passive learning, i.e., the monopolist is only uninformed about the value of = 2 , we …rst discuss the di¤erence between passive and active learning. We assume throughout this paper that the monopolist is a Bayesian learner, i.e., Bayesian methods are used to learn about the environment. In Bayesian analysis, the monopolist begins with prior knowledge expressed as a distribution on the parameter space and updates its beliefs, given the data.
The monopolist is justi…ed using Bayesian methods if the updated beliefs becomes more accurate and precise as more data points are collected. This property is called consistency of the posterior distribution. Consistency implies that the monopolist eventually learns the true value of the unknown parameter. When the parameter space is …nitely-dimensioned, consistency of the posterior distribution is obtained if and only if the value of the unknown parameter lies in the support of the parameter, see Freedman [14] and Schwartz [31] . How-ever, inconsistency of Bayesian procedures is quite general in non-parametric cases, e.g., if the parameter space is in…nitely-dimensioned. A classical example of inconsistency is found in
Freedman [14] . does not arise in our class of models.
Active Learning
Active learning, or experimentation, arises when the monopolist's decisions a¤ect the information used to learn about the unknown parameter. 2;3 In our model, this is the case when the value of is unknown. Let the unknown value of parameter be 2 . The monopolist begins period t with prior beliefs about characterized by the prior p.d.f. t on . That is, for any X , the monopolist's prior probability that 2 X in period t is
After supplying P J j=1 q jt , the monopolist observes a random sample of J prices fP jt g J j=1 , where P jt is a realization of the random priceP jt in market j, j = 1; :::; J, in period t. Let 2 Active learning has been studied in models in which the only link between periods is beliefs. See Prescott [28] [13] , and Keller and Rady [19] . 3 There is an emerging literature on the e¤ect of active learning in dynamic models of economic growth as well as more general dynamic models, beginning with the paper of Freixas [15] , but also including the works of El-Gamal and Sundaram [12] , Bertocchi and Spagat [3] , and Datta et al. [7] . P (P jt jq jt ; ), P jt 2 P , be the p.d.f. of P jt , for each j and t. 4 By Bayes' theorem, the uninformed monopolist's posterior beliefs for period t + 1 are characterized by the posterior
where
is the likelihood function of the random sample fP jt g J j=1 in period t, for given fq jt g Hence, active learning or experimentation is implied. Intuitively, the monopolist's supply decisions may be adjusted to spread apart the distributions from which the prices are drawn, thus making the price more informative signals of the true distribution. 
Passive Learning
Passive learning arises when the monopolist's decisions do not a¤ect the information used to learn about the unknown parameter. 6 This is the case when the value of is unknown. In our model, let the unknown value of parameter be 2 . The monopolist begins period t with prior beliefs about characterized by the prior p.d.f. t . That is, for any X , the monopolist's subjective prior probability that 2 X is 4 The distribution ofP jt is derived from the distribution of" jt , that is, the p.d.f. ofP jt is
jt " jt 2 P . 5 The e¤ect of active learning is studied in a dynamic monopoly without investment in Mirman et al. [25] . 6 Demers [9] studies the investment decision of a perfectly competitive …rm facing a random demand with an unknown mean. The …rm is a passive learner not because of the structure of demand as in our class of models, but because the …rm is a perfect competitor. The …rm has no impact on the demand and, thus, cannot a¤ect the information, regardless of the demand structure.
After supplying P J j=1 q jt , the monopolist observes a random sample of J prices fP jt g J j=1 , where P jt is a realization of the random priceP jt in market j, j = 1; :::; J, in period t. It then solves for f" jt = G (P jt ; q jt ; )g J j=1 in order to form posterior beliefs about . 7 By Bayes' theorem, the uninformed monopolist's posterior beliefs are characterized by the posterior
is the likelihood function of random sample f" jt g J j=1 in period t, for 2 . Notice that the monopolist's supply decisions cannot a¤ect the posterior p.d.f. (4). That is, there is passive learning.
Only is Unknown
We now concentrate on incorporating the passive learning framework into the dynamic model of the …rm. Suppose the monopolist does not know that the value of is 2 ; but knows the value of . Incorporating passive learning into the monopolist's dynamic program (2) adds a stochastic law of motion for beliefs characterized by the posterior p.d.f. (4) ; along with the deterministic law of motion for capital (1) . Note that the law of motion for beliefs (4) is autonomous, in the sense that no action of the uninformed monopolist can in ‡uence its learning. 7 We assume that @g=@" jt > 0 for " jt 2 " so that P jt = g (q jt ; ; " jt ) is uniquely solvable for " jt as a function of P jt and q jt , i.e., there exists a function G such that " jt = G (P jt ; q jt ; ) for each P jt 2 P and 2 .
The uninformed monopolist's dynamic program is summarized by the Bellman equation:
where E f" j g J j=1 j is the expectation operator over f" j g J j=1 conditional on the prior p.d.f. and
, given the prior p.d.f. . 9 
Bayesian Statistics and Techniques
In general, dynamic programs with passive learning such as (5) are intractable, i.e., they are not solvable either analytically or numerically. 10 There are two main issues that need to be addressed. First, the value function V in expression ( for the uninformed monopolist as
4 The E¤ect of Learning
Assumptions
In order to study the maximization problem of the monopolist, we postulate the demand functionP j = q 1 j" j in market j, where > 1 is the elasticity of demand and ln" j N ( ; 1=r). Since the family of lognormal distributions for the random sample f" j g J j=1 belongs to the exponential family of distributions, there exists a conjugate family of distributions for the unknown parameter~ . The conjugate family of distributions for~ is normal with mean and precision > 0. Using (4), the posterior beliefs about~ are normally distributed, i.e., 12 For instance, if the prior p.d.f. of~ is normal with mean and variance 2 , then fb j g 2 j=1 = ; 2 and
~ N (^ ; 1= ( + Jr)), where^
is the posterior mean. The posterior mean (7) is a weighted average of the prior mean and the sample mean " J = (1=J) P J j=1 ln " j . The weights of and " J are proportional to and Jr, respectively. The higher the precision of the prior distribution of~ , the greater the weight that is given to the prior mean , while the greater the size of the data set J or the higher the precision of the data-generating process r, the greater the weight that is given to the sample mean " J . Note also that the variance of the posterior distribution of is decreasing in J. More price observations reveal more information about the unknown parameter . Note also that under our distributional assumptions, the posterior mean Proof. Use Kolmogorov's strong law of large number on the posterior mean (7). Therefore, the uninformed monopolist's beliefs about parameter converges in probability to the true value , implying that the Bayesian estimate on" j also converges to e +1=2r . Without consistency of the Bayes procedure, using Bayesian methods does not lead to learning about the environment.
Further assumptions are needed to study the e¤ect of learning in this model. The monopolist faces the production function f (k) = k 14;15 14 The restriction = 1 1= serves two purposes. First, it yields closed-form solutions of the monopolist's optimal supply and investment decisions. Second, it is a su¢ cient condition ensuring that an interior solution always exists with strictly positive pro…ts. That is, the restriction rules out any exit strategy. Suppose that < 1 1= ;
then it is possible that the monopolist exits permanently. 15 The cost function we use is very general and admits di¤erent scenarios. Consider three of them.
1. The case of = 1 and > 1. Here, the monopolist employs l j workers to produce q j for market j, e.g., the monopolist employs l j …shermen in market j to extract the stock of …sh k. The …nal-output production is of the form
and the cost function for labor l j is l j , then
q j ; where = and = .
2. The case of > 1 and = 1. The monopolist centralizes production. The …nal-output production is of the form
and the cost function for labor l is l, then
where = and = .
where the pair fb n g 2 n=1
( ; ) and
given the uninformed monopolist's beliefs about .
The Benchmark Model
In order to measure the e¤ect of learning on the monopolist's behavior, we solve the dynamic program for the informed monopolist, i.e., the value of is 2 . Then, the informed monopolist's dynamic program is
; (11) where ln" j iidN ( ; 1=r). Here,
is the joint p.d.f. of f" j g J j=1 given the information of the informed monopolist about . Note that the stock of capital is the only state variable for the informed monopolist's dynamic program.
The Supply and Investment Strategies
The next two propositions present the optimal supply and investment strategies of the uninformed and informed monopolists, respectively.
Proposition 4
If the monopolist is uninformed, i.e., dynamic program (10), then
is unique and characterized implicitly by
where ! U ! U ( ; ).
Proposition 5
If the monopolist is informed, i.e., dynamic program (11), then 
Note that ! U ( ; ) and ! I are similar since expressions (12) and (13) have the same structure. The only di¤erence between expressions (12) and (13) is the expectation of the demand shock given the information available to the monopolist. The uninformed monopolist's expected mean of the demand shock is e
while the informed monopolist's is e
Therefore, the other structural parameters , , , , J, , , , and a¤ect the supply and investment decisions in the same direction, whether the monopolist is uninformed or informed. They only di¤er in magnitude because of di¤erences on the expectation of the demand shock.
Note also that the uninformed monopolist's share of output to each market ! U ( ; ) evolves over time as beliefs are updated after each period since and are two state variables with the autonomous laws of motion (7) and^ = + Jr. This does not happen with the informed monopolist since ! I is …xed over time.
The Cost Function. The presence of a cost function is essential in our model for learning to a¤ect behavior. Formally,
Proposition 6
If there is no cost, i.e., = 0, then learning does not a¤ect the monopolist's behavior, i.e., whether or not the monopolist knows that the value of is ,
is supplied to market j andK
When there is no cost, = 0, the uncertainty in demand is multiplicative. Therefore, the information about the distribution of the demand shock does not a¤ect the monopolist's behavior. When > 0, the uncertainty is no longer multiplicative and it follows that Proposition 7 If there is a cost, i.e., > 0, then learning a¤ects the monopolist's behavior. , then Q U < Q I andK U >K I :
If e
In other words, from Proposition 7, beliefs about the demand shock a¤ect the …rm's behavior. When the uninformed monopolist has more pessimistic beliefs about the mean of the demand shock than the informed monopolist, i.e., e It is worth noting that a higher precision of the beliefs, i.e., a higher , decreases the expectation of the demand shock, i.e., e
is negatively related to the precision of beliefs.
This means that @Q U =@ < 0. This is due to the lognormality of the demand shock that makes the precision part of the mean of the demand shock.
Correct Beliefs. Suppose now that the uninformed monopolist has correct beliefs about the value of but remains uninformed. Two cases are studied. First, suppose that = , In other words, from Proposition 8, the uninformed monopolist supplie s more than the informed monopolist when = . Although the uninformed monopolist faces more uncertainty than the informed monopolist since < +1 and, has a higher expectation of the demand shock, since e
. Therefore, the uninformed monopolist supplies more and invests less.
Second, suppose that the uninformed monopolist incorrect beliefs about the value of ; but has correct beliefs about the expectation of the demand shocks, i.e., = 1= and thus e 
In other words, from Proposition 9, learning has no e¤ect on the monopolist's supply and investment decisions when the expectation on the demand shock is the same for both the uninformed and informed monopolists. In our class of models, if e
, then Q U = Q I . We now investigate whether this is always true in a more general setting.
Consider the expression
where L U is the likelihood function of the uninformed monopolist, given its beliefs about while L I is the likelihood function of the informed monopolist, given that = is known.
In the static case, under expression (14), Q U = Q I , since the uninformed and informed monopolists maximize the same objective function. In our class of models, expression (14) is equivalent to e
In general, the uninformed monopolist's dynamic program is
while the informed monopolist's dynamic program is
When the uncertainty is multiplicative in demand, expression ( , and Q U = Q I and the value function is of the form
where Z 1 , W , and Z 2 are functions, so that the updated value function is
Otherwise, it is not necessarily the case that the expected continuation of the value function is of the form (16) and Q U = Q I when expression (14) holds regardless of the demand structure.
The Steady State Levels of Supply and Capital
Although learning a¤ects the monopolist's supply and investment decisions, it does not change the steady state levels of supply and capital because the uninformed monopolist becomes informed about the value of the unknown parameter in the limit. Incomplete learning cannot occur in our model since the Bayes procedure is consistent. In other words, , then Q U < Q I . As a result, learning speeds up the convergence rate toward the steady state if and only of k < K.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
We …rst show that the instantaneous pro…t function
is strictly concave. Then, we show that the value function is of the form
where Z 1 ( ; ) ; Z 2 ( ; ) > 0 are functions of and , but not k, and that the optimal quantity supplied is symmetric across markets, unique, and of the form
Note that ! U ( ; ) < ( J) 1 implies that some output is invested for next period, i.e.,
implies that the instantaneous pro…t function (17) is strictly positive in equilibrium. The Hessian H of expression (17) evaluated at the symmetric optimal quantity sup-
f (k) for all j, has elements
; j 6 = m, j; m = 1; :::; J. Given the restrictions on the values of the parameters, H jj < H jm < 0, and H jm = H|m, for all j; m;|;m = 1; :::; J. Therefore, the determinants of the principal minors are of the right sign and H is negative definite. It follows that the instantaneous pro…t function (17) is strictly concave for
2. Updating the value function (18) and plugging it into value function (10) yields
are functions of and . The …rst-order conditions are
j = 1; :::; J. Considering a symmetric optimal supply function of the form 
for all j, since = 1 1= . 16 Using the fact that Q U = ! U f (k), the value function for the uninformed monopolist (19) is
so that 16 We write ! U instead of ! U ( ; ) to simplify notation. and
for ! U 2 0; min ( J)
1=
, and where z 2 is de…ned in expression (20) .
Plugging expression (23) into the …rst-order condition (22), using assumption (8), and rearranging terms yields the implicit characterization of ! U , g ! U ; e + r+ 2r
In expression (24), the left-hand side is g ! U ; e
while the right-hand side is 
ii. @g ! U ; e + r+ 2r
which is strictly negative for ! U 2 0; min ( J) 
(b) The properties of h (! U ) are i.
ii.
which is strictly positive for ! U 2 0; min ( J) 1 ; 
, then
If 
> 0:
3. Therefore, given the parametric assumptions and combining properties (25) , (26), (27) , (28) , (29) 
. Therefore, 0 < Z 1 ( ; ) ; Z 2 ( ; ) ; z 1 ; z 2 < 1 and are functions of and , but not k, and the value function is bounded and of the form V U (k; ; ) = Z 1 ( ; ) k 
f (k) for the dynamic program (10).
Proof of Proposition 5
Proving proposition 5 involves similar steps to those in the proof of proposition 4. The informed monopolist supplies Q I = ! I f (k), where ! I 2 0; min ( J) 
Proof of Propositions 7, 8, and 9
Recall that the uninformed monopolist supplies 
while the informed monopolist supplies Q I = ! I f (k), where ! I is implicitly characterized by g ! I ; e , ! U S ! I , Q U S Q I :
Propositions 7, 8, and 9 follow.
